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Whatever the final outcome of the Suez Canal crisis, one feature
will have a far-reaching effect on the practice-as well as the concept
-- of a basic tenet of international law; namely, that expropriation of
foreign property will be recognized only when accompanied by "ad-
equate, effective and prompt" compensation.1
It would seem that international recognition of foreign expropria-
tion is no longer conditioned upon a promise, much less a guarantee
of compensation. The tripartite statement of August 3, 1956 on the
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company expressly mentioned that
the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States
"do not question the right of Egypt to enjoy and exercise all powers of
a fully sovereign and independent nation, including the generally rec-
ognized right, under appropriate conditions, to nationalize assets not
impressed with an international interest, which are subject to its polit-
ical authority." I Such "appropriate conditions" are obvious in the
promise of compensation "in accordance with the Paris Bourse quo-
tations" of July 25, the day preceding the nationalization decree,3 and
t International Vice Pres., American Arbitration Association.
1. See U.S. Dep't of State aide-memoire, Aug. 28, 1953, 29 DWP'T STATI5 BULL. 357
(1953) (regarding the expropriation of Guatamalan properties of the United Fruit Co.)
2. U.S. DiW'T or STATE, THE Surzz CAXAL PROBLEM 35 (1956).
3. Statement of President Nasser, rejecting the invitation to the London Confer-
ence, Aug. 12, 1956. Id. at 47. "(1033)
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the Egyptian Government's "readiness to pay full compensation to the
shareholders of the Company." ' However, the presidential decree of
July 26, 1956 on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company pro-
vided in article I that "payment of said indemnity shall be effected
after the Nation has taken delivery of all the assets and properties of
the nationalized company." 5
The tripartite statement, though disputed in its wisdom despite
the then prevailing circumstances of the sudden Suez crisis 6 -es-
pecially in view of the lack of any qualification of international recog-
nition of foreign expropriations ("appropriate conditions") -is not a
novum. It is obviously an expression of recent development of inter-
national law in the practice of governments."
This development shows a new international "law" governing the
taking of property of foreigners when in the national interest of a coun-
try in which such assets are located. Economic development, not only
in underdeveloped countries, may require appropriation of public re-
sources for public use. It has been labeled the sovereign right of coun-
tries to dispose of natural resources and wealth, without mentioning
an express or implied obligation to compensate foreign investors. The
resolution of the General Assembly of December 21, 1952 recognized
such a right I and in spite of the criticism encountered,9 it has been
re-incorporated in article 1(2) of the United Nations Draft Covenants
4. Egyptian proposal for a new Suez conference, Sept. 10, 1956. Id. at 328.
5. Id. at 31. The translation in an Egyptian government publication reads: "Pay-
ment of compensation shall take place immediately after the state receives all the assets
and property of the nationalized company." TH8 Suzz CANAL, FA cS AND Docu-
MENTs 20 (1956). (Emphasis added.) The memorandum of President Nasser, March
28, 1957, on the operation of the Suez Canal provides: "The question of compensation
and claims in connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Maritime Company
shall, unless agreed between the parties concerned, be referred to arbitration in accord-
ance with the established international practice." N.Y. Times, April 25, 1957, p. 8,
col. 3. The New Zealand Ambassador, Sir Leslie Knox Monroe, in an address entitled
"Hungary and Suez-Problems in World Order," said, "Has the requirement of inter-
national law been fulfilled? Indeed, it can be seriously questioned whether Egypt has
had at any time the capacity to pay prompt and adequate compensation." 12 N.Y. Ci'y
BAR Ass'x R-mcR 12, 17 (1957).
6. Cf. Note, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, 70 HARv. L. Rtv. 480,
486 (1957) ; Olmstead, International Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 8 (1957). For a bib-
liography of recent date, see RATSCHNiGG, DiR Smir Tm Drx SuEz..AxA 175 (1956);
The Suez Canal, 5 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 73 (Supp. 1956).
7. Compare the statement of Verdross, the leading Austrian writer on international
law, that indemnification of expropriated foreigners may take "into consideration the
financial capacity of the expropriating state," VMDaoss, VO1L XtRuCHT 291 (3d ed.
1955), with his earlier view that "appropriate" compensation is required, VERDRoss,
VOILMCMUMCH 275 (2d ed. 1950). For recent examples of state practice, see the auth-
orization of the British Foreign Compensation Commission to settle claims for British
property rights expropriated by Poland; the agreement between Sweden and Czecho-
slovalda, Dec. 22, 1956, on indemnification of Swedish claims for losses incurred as a
consequence of the 1945 Czechoslovakian nationalization legislation, Foreign Com-
merce Weekly, Feb. 11, 1957, p. 9.
8. U.N. Doc. No. A/2332 (1952).
9. Cf. 8 N.Y. Crr BAR Ass'N ERcoR 250 (1953) (hereinafter cited as REcoRD).
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on Human Rights of the Third Committee of the General Assembly,
as follows:
"The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their
natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations
arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the
principle of mutual benefit and international law. In no case may
a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." 10
It is true that the United States delegate commented that a large
number of delegations interpreted this draft provision as not permitting
any nationalization without the payment of adequate compensation to
the foreign investor. However, it may be somewhat characteristic that
in a recent diplomatic document dated February 11, 1957, the Soviets,
referring to the Middle East, stated that "the natural wealth of the
underdeveloped countries is the inalienable national property of the
peoples of these countries, which have the full right to dispose of and
use it in the interests of their national economy and progress." "1
Not a word of any compensation! We have to face the fact that
competitive coexistence, in one form or the other, is here to stay, bring-
ing about new challenges which the Western world has to meet by new
approaches to international legal relations. It will certainly not be
enough to merely deplore the situation. Creative thought will become
necessary to cope with new challenges.
The task of devising new forms of protection for American invest-
ments is not easy. It is therefore fortunate that a constructive attempt
is being made to create a commission which should, among other things,
make recommendations for the security of American foreign invest-
ment.:" A memorandum of explanation 13 sets forth that "something
more than our usual treaties and agreements is essential, [namely] the
need for the establishment of a uniform international code regulating
and protecting investments of capital goods and services, private as well
as governmental, coincident with and beyond the normal scope of
treaties of friendship and navigation, is made evident from govern-
mental policies and world conditions." 14
10. For the full text of article I and the history of this movement, see Hyde,
Per wnent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 854,
856 (1956); cf. THOMAS & THOMAS, NoN-INTERVENTION, THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT
IN AMERICA 349 (1956).
11. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1957, p. 4, col. 6.
12. See S.J. Rzs. 21, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), introduced Jan. 7, 1957 by
Senator Olin D. Johnston. An identical bill, H.j. REs. 160, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957),
was introduced Jan. 14, 1957 by Representative Armistead I. Selden. Hearings on the
bill opened on Feb. 28, 1957 before an ad hoc subcommittee of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
13. 103 CoNG. Rzc. 357 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1957).
14. The memorandum refers to studies "being made by national and international
bar groups," having obviously in mind, e.g., the following studies: 6 RECOaD 127 (1951) ;
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It is true that in treaties, traditional law offers a weapon of old
standing. One must, however, be aware that even such advanced
attempts as the recent commercial treaties of the United States are
no longer sufficient. These new treaties 1' protect nationals and cor-
porations against taking of their property in the country of the other
treaty party by providing that it shall not be taken without due process
of law and payment of effective compensation. In addition, property
owners are given the right to withdraw the compensation by obtaining
foreign exchange at a reasonable rate.' The most recent United States
treaty, that with Korea of November 28, 1956, provides in article
VI (4) :
"Property of nationals and companies of either Party shall
not be taken within the territories of the other Party except for a
public purpose, nor shall it be taken without prompt payment of
just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively
realizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of the prop-
erty taken; and adequate provision shall have been made at or
prior to the time of taking for the determination and payment
thereof." "
The protocol to that treaty, of the same date, states: "The provisions
of Article VI, paragraph 4, providing for the payment of compensation
shall extend to interests held directly or indirectly by nationals and com-
panies of either Party in property which is taken within the territories
of the other Party." I"
Another protection of American foreign investments consists of
economic cooperation agreements, concluded with many countries
under the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948."9 They provide for
7 RECORD 219 (1952); 8 REcoRD 250 (1953) ; E cONOMIC WAIARI COMMITTE, SUG-
GESTIONS AND REcOMMENDATIONS BY CERTAIN MEBERS (1956); Schroeder, The Ex-
propriation of Property, in INTER-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NINTH CONPERENcE 59, 271 (1956); Trejos & Carrasco, Reimbursement of Capital
and Profits of Foreign Investments, in id. at 111. On the viewpoints of an investment
treaty program, see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN PRIVATE ENTER-
PRIsE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THIE AID PROGRAMS 56, 62 (1957);
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON A Nzw
EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC DErLOPMENT AROAD 12 (1957); CITIZEN ADVISORY CoM-
MiTTE, REPORT ON THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM 8 (1957).
15. Cf. Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement anld Protection of Foreign In-
vestment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. Comp. L. 229 (1956); Panuch,
A Bwrinesswmn's Philosophy for Foreign Affairs, Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April 1957,
pp. 41, 52.
16. Protocol of the Treaty With Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, [1956] 7 U.S. TREATms
& OTH R INT'L AGREEMENTS 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, provides for "an effective rate
which, inclusive of any taxes or changes on exchange transfers, is just and reasonable."
17. Printed in SEN. ExEC. Doc. D., 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
18. Id. at 15.
19. Act of April 3, 1948, c. 169, 62 STAT. 137. See Surrey, The Econmic Cooper-
ation Act of 1948, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 509, 551 (1948) ; Not6, Constitutional Protection
Against Foreign Decrees Confiscating Assetsin the United States, 58 YAM. L.J. 321,
327 (1949).
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submission to arbitration of any dispute involving "compensation of a
national of the United States for governmental measures affecting his
property rights." 20 Similar provisions are included in the Guarantee
Agreements, as authorized by the Mutual Securities Act of 1954.2"
There the claims arising out of expropriation of properties to which
the United States Government may be subrogated by reason of any pay-
ment under such a guarantee, shall be finally settled through arbitra-
tion.' This is, to say the least, a rather novel feature of international
economic cooperation: to shift to the taxpayer " the burden of guar-
antees against what may be categorized as political rather than com-
mercial risks, not only in this country, but also abroad." Guarantees
of the United States against losses due to expropriation and against
inconvertibility of foreign currency, available in some thirty countries
through the International Cooperation Administration, have recently
been extended to protect foreign American investments against war
damage. Such a new program must be developed in agreements be-
tween the United States and the appropriate foreign governments,25
in an era in which economic warfare, warlike acts, and other unde-
clared belligerency will make the exact definition of "war" indis-
pensable."
And yet, treaty protection may not always be possible, even on a
bilateral basis, though the United States State Department effectively
pursues this method in the program of negotiations of new commercial
treaties. Even less probable will be the protection of private invest-
ment interests by a multilateral convention, somewhat like a Code of
Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments, as drafted in 1949 by the
International Chamber of Commerce 2 7 or in the recommendations of
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations for fair prac-
tice in the field of private foreign investment.2" More recently, a Magna
20. E.g., Agreement With France of June 20, 1948, art. 10, 43 Am. J. INT'L L.
111, 121 (Supp. 1949).
21. 68 STAT. 847 (1954), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 1933 (Supp. III, 1955). See
Agreement with Turkey of Jan. 15, 1957, T.I.A.S. No. 3761. It appears from a
communication of Oct. 5, 1955 to this writer from the International Cooperation Ad-
ministration, which administers the Investment Guarantee Program, that the United
States is not required to exhaust its remedies in local courts.
22. Domke, The Settlement of Ideniatiowal Investment Disputes, 12 Bus. LAW.
262 (1957).
23. Cf. U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY REs. 824, 9th Sess. (1954), recommending ar-
rangements with underdeveloped countries providing "for the insurability of certain
non-business risks." See Hyde, supra note 10, at 866, and U.N. Doc. No. A/C.2/L.310
(1957).
24. For a comparative study, cf. Export Credit Insurance Systems, 8 INT. MARSrS
22 (1954).
25. Foreign Commerce Weekly, March 11, 1957, p. 28.
26. As to the Egyptian legislation, see note 38 infra.
27. See INTERNA'IONAL CHAMBER OP CommERc, BRocHuEa No. 129 (1949).
28. See International Chamber of Commerce News, Jan. 1957, p. 2.
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Carta to preserve the sanction of private property and investment has
been suggested by the German Society for the Protection of Private
Investment,29 and in deliberations, the International Bar Association,
at its conference in Oslo, Norway, in August 1956.30
Recently at the National Foreign Trade Convention it was cor-
rectly observed that:
"[O]ur own Government can and should aid in the creation
abroad of climates conducive to private investment by the conclu-
sion of Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, tax
conventions and other appropriate agreements with countries
with which such agreements do not now exist, and by revision and
modernization, where necessary, of existing agreements." 31
Indeed, on the occasions of the hearings on the Commercial Treaties
with Iran, Nicaragua and the Netherlands, of July 3, 1956,32 a revision
had been suggested to the effect that the definition of "property" should
cover all types of property, including tangibles, and that the definition
"taking" should also include "measures which, though falling just
short of seizure of the full title to the property, effectively deprive its
owner of the use and enjoyment thereof, [as] for example the appoint-
ment of a custodian." 3
Treaty protection, however, will not always be available and at
times will be less efficient than resort to court action when assets of the
expropriated company are located outside of the expropriating coun-
try.3 4 Moreover, executive action, though less frequently used, be-
comes for the time being at least, an efficient means of preserving rights
of the expropriated company and its shareholders, as was demonstrated
in the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. 5 When the Egyp-
tian Government appropriated the company's assets-even those
located abroad-by its decree of July 26, 1956,3" one of the first actions
29. See 102 CONG. REc. 2194A (daily ed. March 9, 1956) ; 103 id. 934A (daily ed.
Feb. 11, 1957).
*30. ECONOMIC WARPARE COMMITTEE, SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY
CERTAIN AMERICAN MEmBERs 5 (1956).
31. See 103 CONG. REc. 1297 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1957).
32. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign. Relations on Executives E,
G, and H, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1955).
33. Id. at 15. On the protection of foreign investment in this country and the
protection of U.S. investment abroad within the framework of the foreign relations
law project of the American Law Institute, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEED-
INGS or ANNUAL MEETING 91 (1956).
34. For a recent survey, see ADRIAANSE, CONFISCATION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 150 (1956).
35. As to restrictions under the Constantinople Convention of Oct. 29, 1888 (trans-
lation in U.S. DEr'T OF STATE, THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEm 16 (1956)), see Dinitz,
The Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Blockade of the Siez Canal, 45 GEO. L.J. 169, 176
(1957); Andrews, Sites Canal Controversy, 21 ALBANY L. REv. 14, 21 (1957).
36. U.S. DEP'T op STATE, THE SuEz CANAL PROBLEM 35 (1956).
1957] PROTECTION AGAINST FOREIGN EXPROPRIATION 1039
of the Western powers was to block those assets belonging to Egypt as
well as the Canal which had their situs in Great Britain and France.3"
Also blocked were transactions involving property in which Egypt, or
the Suez Canal Company, had "any interest of any nature whatso-
ever, direct or indirect," under the foreign assets control of the United
States, through the Department of the Treasury, as early as July 31,
1956, to which some license provisions authorizing current transac-
tions were added on August 1, 1956.8 The regulations were still in
effect as of March 1957.
These measures of the Western countries followed the pattern of
economic warfare as experienced through blocking of property in
World War II. The Egyptian Government, under the impact of the
military action of Great Britain and France, countered with a military
proclamation, November 1, 1956, on trade relations with British and
French nationals and measures applying to their properties,3" after the
latter's withdrawal from Egyptian territory. These measures of
sequestration of assets affect individuals and corporate entities of
British and French nationality regardless of residence, and of Egyptian
or other nationalities which "are under British or French control or
involve important British or French interests." "o The detailed regula-
tions (of thirty-five articles) are patterned after the trading-with-the-
enemy legislation of Western European countries during World War
IL41 Though the word "enemy" is nowhere used, they go somewhat
further in not allowing any resident British or national access to
Egyptian courts.' Consideration of this Egyptian legislation and its
implementation by various decrees ' is outside the scope of this article.
37. Exchange Control (Payments) (Egyptian Monetary Area) Order, 1956, and
Control of Gold and Securities (Suez Canal Company) Direction, 1956, STAT. INsT,.
1956, Nos. 1163, 1164. The blocked assets in Britain are estimated at 150,000,000 pound
sterling ($420,800,000). N.Y. Times, March 2, 1957, p. 1, col. 5.
38. 31 C.F.R. § 510201 (Supp. 1956). The frozen Egyptian funds are esti-
mated at $50,000,000. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1957, p. 13, col. 2. Pursuant to 31 C.F.R.
§ 510.502 (Supp. 1956), transactions are licensed "provided that any payment by or on
behalf of any ship owner or ship operator subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States made in Egypt or to the Government of Egypt or any instrumentality thereof
with respect to charges in connection with the transit of the Suez Canal is licensed
only if accompanied by a statement that the payment is made 'under protest and with-
out prejudice to all rights of recovery or otherwise.' "
39. Official Journal, No. 88, his A, Nov. 1, 1956.
40. Art. 1(2) (2). Military Proclamation No. 4 of the same day provided for
sequestration of the assets of interned persons other than British and French nationals
residing in Egypt who are suspected of activities unfriendly to Egypt in the present
emergency.
41. For a comparative survey of that legislation, see Dom=, TRADING WITH T114
Emmy iN WORLD WAR II (1943) ; DoMKF, THz CONTROL op ALEN PROPRTY (1947).
42. Contrary to the American concept, see Ex parte Kumezo Kawato, 317 U.S.
69 (1942).
43. Among them is the program of "Egyptianization" of all British and French
businesses in Egypt, requiring that all banks, insurance companies and foreign com-
mercial enterprises be placed under the control of Egyptians. Foreign firms other than
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These measures present somewhat novel features for a future settlement
since claims and counterclaims by the government concerned and the
reciprocal blocking of foreign assets will certainly have an effect on the
concept of protection of private property and long term investments.
It has been wisely noted:
"The privileges [contracts] that go with sovereignty and the
rights inherent in private property still are uneasy partners in the
international community, despite their dependence on each other.
Some more workable solution to these conflicts of interest must be
found if there is to be any significant future for the international
play of private contracts." "
We are, of course, aware of the fact that the Suez Canal crisis
is not solely-or even principally-concerned with the nationalization
of the Suez Canal Company. More is involved, namely the unilateral
abrogation by a foreign government of contracts voluntarily entered
into which it decides no longer to respect. The Foreign National Trade
Convention was correct in stating:
"The Convention holds that maintenance of the principle of
sanctity of contract is fundamental to the whole process of inter-
national trade and investment. Without sanctity of contract there
can be no respect for private property rights, and no reliance upon
agreements made between nation and nation, or between nations
and private parties, or between private parties themselves." '
Similarly, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, in its
Policy Declaration on World Affairs in 1956 stated:
"There is need for world-wide recognition of the sanctity of
contract. Agreements made within the general legal framework
or in the form of specific contracts should be honored fully in let-
ter and spirit. Modifications should be by mutual consent. This
is of special importance when governments are parties to agree-
ments or partners in enterprises." 46
Here we are only concerned with the legal aspects of investment
protection and not with unilateral cancellation of concession rights. In
British and French were given five years in which to convert to Egyptian stock com-
panies with exclusively Egyptian stockholders and directors. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1957,
p. 6, col. 3. Translations of the so-called Egyptianization Laws No. 22, 23 and 24 of
Jan. 15, 1957, and of the Ministry of Commerce Order No. 42, implementing Law No.
24 of Feb. 3, 1957 are to be found in Foreign Commerce Weekly, March 4, 1957, p. 5.
44. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1957, p. 39, col. 4.
45. See 103 CoNG. Rtc. 1297 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1957).
46. International Chamber of Commerce Resolution of Oct. 22, 1956, Doe. No.
100172, likewise declared that "the seizure of the Suez properties without notice or
negotiation is certain to weaken the confidence of businessmen in the guarantees of the
Egyptian Government and all governments which condone this action. Unless this
confidence is restored, the development of all countries where investment capital is
needed may be postponed for many years. "
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this respect, a specific issue arises in that the Egyptian nationalization
decree of July 26, 1956 expressly extends to those assets of the Suez
Canal Company' 7 located abroad. Thus, on February 12, 19574s the
French Government introduced a bill declaring the Compagnie Univer-
selle de Suez to be a purely French Company not subject to the laws
of a foreign state. This was intended to safeguard the assets and activ-
ities of that company in France and elsewhere against any interference
by the Egyptian Government. How far such "national" (French) law
will be able to attain its purpose post factum and receive international
recognition remains to be seen.41
Similar problems of expropriation of assets abroad have recently
arisen again in connection with nationalization measures of Eastern
European countries under communist control. Unlike Russian com-
panies in 1918, business enterprises in Eastern Europe, especially in
the Eastern part of Germany, are still in manifold commercial contact
with the Western world: claims arise for payment of goods delivered
before the nationalization of the enterprise; others arise out of agency
arrangements, industrial property rights, etc. State-owned entities to
which the property of nationalized corporations was allocated, tried to
reach assets located outside of the territory of the expropriating State.
Such appropriation of foreign assets in nationalized corporations is
often sought through expropriation of the rights of shareholders. The
expropriating authorities are able to leave the corporation in its exist-
ing status, thus preserving its identity as a domestic commercial entity
as distinguished from its shareholders who live abroad. Problems aris-
ing from the division of once unified countries (Germany) are also far
from being solved.""
Among the intricate legal questions are those of the dissolution of
corporationg which are governed by the law of the country of their in-
corporation. Many legal articles have been published " and numerous
47. U.S. DiT oi STATz, THs Sunz CANAL PROBLEM 35 (1956).
48. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1957, p. 7, col. 1.
49. The exposi des motifs states that the proposed bill will affirm that the com-
pany remains governed by French law "especially with regard to everything that has
relation to its existence, its organs and its property, without being affected by the
provisions of a foreign law." Le Monde (Paris), Feb. 14,.1957, p. 3. (Translation
ours.)
50. For an official compilation of texts of expropriation measures, see DIE ETEIG-
NUNGEN IN DER SowjmIscHEN BESATZUNGSZONE UND DIE VERWALTUNG DES VER-
mOEGENS VON NIcHT IN DER SOwJETZoNE ANSAESSIGEN PERSONEN (The Expropria-
tions in the Soviet Occupation Zone and the Administration of Property of Persons
Not Resident in the Soviet Zone) (1956).
51. For foreign writings which appeared since 1956, see The Case of the Singapore
Oil Stocks, 5 IxT. & Comp. L.Q. 84 (1956) ; Lewald, Das Internationale Enteignungs-
recht ins Licht Nemen Schrifttuins (The International Law of Expropriation in the
Light of Recent Literature), 21 ZM'rSCHRIFT 1UER AUSLAZNDIScHEs UND INTERNA-
TIONALXS PRIVAMCHT 119 (Germany 1956); Niederer, Einige Grensfragen des Ordre
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court decisions rendered in France,5 2 West Germany,"3 Switzerland,"4
Austria " and in this country," on the various aspects of expropriation
of foreign corporations. The concept of "piercing the corporate veil,"
originally used to determine the enemy character of corporations under
wartime regulations, 7 may be used here as a device to make property
located abroad available to shareholders outside of the expropriating
country, as the real owners in interest of a proportionate portion. Prob-
lems of location of claims, especially those presented by bearer shares,5 8
play a decisive role in preventing foreign nationalization measures, at
least partly, from having an effect abroad.
The Suez Canal crisis demonstrates that international law failed
to offer new solutions adequate to meet new problems. The fact will
have to be faced that economic necessity may require nationalization of
properties in many countries. Legal protection of the investor, in judi-
cial determination of his rights in the foreign country as well as on the
international level, requires a new approach to time-old remedial aspect
Public in Faellen Entschaedigungsloser Konfiskation (Some Boundary Questions of
Public Policy in Cases of Confiscation Without Compensation), 11 ScHW=zRISeHnS
JAHRBUCH VUER INTERNATIONALFs RzCHT 91, 102 (Germany 1956); RASCHHOFER, DIE
VERMOEGENSKONFISIATION DER OSTBLOCKSTAATEN (Property Confiscation by States of
the East Block) (1956); Roos, ZuR KomtnsscTIoN PRIVATER DZUTSCHER AUSLANDS-
VERMoteN. BEniRAG ZUR VOELKXRRECHTLICHEN STELLUNG DES PRIVAtIGENTUMS (On
the Confiscation of German Private Assets Abroad. Contribution to the International
Law Viewpoint of Private Property) (1956) ; Seidl-Hohenveldern, Die Spaltungstheorie
im Falle der Konfiskation von Aktionaerrechten (The Separability Theory in Case of
Confiscation of Shareholder Rights), 6 JAHRBUCH FuER INTERNATiONALES RECHT
263 (Germany 1956); Seidl-Hohenveldern, Problems des Internationalen Konfiska-
tions und Enteignungsrechts (Confiscation and Expropriation Problems in International
Law), 83 JOURNAL Du DROiT INTERNATIONAL 380 (France 1956). See also Yokota,
The International Effects of Nationalization, 2 HIKAKUHO-ZASSNI 184 (Japan 1954) ;
Egawa, The Internationtal Effects of Nationalization--Laws From the Points of View
of Conflict of Laws, id. at 247 (for summary of both in English, see THE JAPAN
ANNUAL OF LAW AND POLITICs 66, 125 (Science Council of Japan Pub. No. 4 (1956)) ;
Cassoni, La Nazionalizzazione delle Societti e il Diritto Internazionale Privato, 7 Jus
253 (Italy 1956); Foighel, Nationalization-A Study in the Protection of Alien Prop-
erty in International Law, 26 NoRisH TIDSSKMsn FOR INTL Ri. 89 (1956).
52. Cf. Ilitch v. Banque Franco-Serbe, Tribunal de commerce de la Seine, Feb. 9,
1956, 45 REvuE CRiTIQux DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRnm 647 (France 1956).
53. 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 93 (1954).
54. Id. at 87.
55. Sommerich, Austria: German Tradenarks and the 1883 Paris Convention, 46
TRADamnxa REP. 1333 (1956).
56. Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956) (Hungarian na-
tionalization) ; Stephen v. Zivnostenka Banka, 155 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2
App. Div. 2d 958, 157 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1st Dept 1956), motion for leave to appeal to
Court of Appeals granted, 158 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
57. Berger, "Disregarding the Corporate Entity" for Stockholders Benefit, 55
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